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Abstract 
 Advances in robotics and artificial intelligence introduce increasingly capable robots to 
society. Such skilled robots bring into question the importance of an object’s capabilities in 
determining its animacy. This is particularly salient among children, who make the most mistakes 
in distinguishing animate and inanimate objects. It is common for children to give inanimate 
objects animate traits; in this way, able-bodied robots could become “animate”. The purpose of 
this study is to address whether or not providing an object with enough behavioral and intellec tua l 
capabilities can change the object’s animacy. A total of 90 children (ages 3, 5, and 7) will interact 
with either a human or a robot that displays different levels of ability. Following each interaction 
period, children will be asked to attribute biological and psychological characteristics to the person 
or robot. Because children have been shown to link animacy with certain traits, the addition (or 
subtraction) of enough of these traits may come to change the overall animacy of the object.   
Introduction 
 The field of robotics poses a new set of questions for the distinction between animate and 
inanimate objects. As technologies progress, robots are able to display increasing levels of 
intelligence and take a variety of different forms. As these advances occur, questions of life and 
animacy become progressively more relevant. It is especially important to note that children grow 
up immersed in society’s most advanced technological culture, and thus will have an increasingly 
normative experience with robots. In addition, children err much more than adults in distinguishing 
animate and inanimate objects (Dolgin & Behrend, 1984; Jipson & Gelman, 2007). To address the 
question of animacy and advancing robotics, this study will vary the abilities of robots and humans 
to gain a better understanding of how abilities correlate to animacy.   
 Children have diverse and developing views of what constitutes an animate or an 
inanimate object (Beran et al., 2011; Dolgin & Behrend, 1984; Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Opfer, 
2002; Opfer & Siegler, 2004). Regardless of age, children commonly struggle to classify objects 
that only partially align with their understanding of living things. For instance, children typically 
think of plants as non-living since they do not move or have a face (Opfer & Siegler, 2004). At 
the same time, they may consider dolls to be animate because of their human resemblance 
(Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Dolgin & Behrend, 1984). While this difficulty is shown regardless of 
age, different age groups show different tendencies when classifying these objects. The most 
errors are seen among 3-5 year old children, while by 7-9 years of age their errors drastically 
decrease and closely resemble adult responses (Dolgin & Behrend, 1984). In general, these errors 
over-extend animacy, as children under twelve are more animistic than teenagers or adults 
(Beran et al. 2011). Certain age groups, however, may diverge from this trend. While three and 
four year olds make the most errors, these errors are distributed in the same way as adults’ errors. 
Five year olds are particularly of interest as there have been conflicting results at this age. Dolgin 
& Behrend (1984) found that 5 year olds tended to overclassify things as animate, while Opfer 
(2002) found that 5 year olds were the least likely to extend animacy to a given object.  
 One approach to studying the animate-inanimate distinction is to look at animacy as being 
driven by specific characteristics. Several of these driving characteristics relate to the embodiment 
of the object. Consider the impact that having a face has on an object. In infancy, babies show a 
preference for properly configured and detailed faces (Johnson et al., 1991). While for infants this 
is only a visual preference, this idea of a properly configured face later influences how likely we 
are to judge the item as animate. The more human a face looks, the more likely it is to be perceived 
as animate (Looser & Wheatley, 2010). Johnson, Slaugher, and Carey (1998) also looked at the 
influence a face has on how infants respond to inanimate objects. Giving an inanimate object a 
face served to cause the same response that is otherwise exclusive to animate objects. The presence 
of a face can similarly cause distinctions in different living things. An animate object with a face 
is perceived as more animate than a living thing that does not have a face (Jipson & Gelman, 2007). 
Additionally, embodiment in general impacts how the object is perceived. Barneck et al. (2009) 
looked at the role of embodiment in determining the animacy of robots. They found that the 
embodiment of the robot changed how easy it was to interact with the robot and how friendly it 
was thought to be.  
 While visual characteristics are important, they often work in tandem with behavioral 
characteristics. In the animacy of robots specifically, visual characteristics were only salient when 
combined intelligence (Bartneck et al., 2009). Of the many behavioral characteristics of animate 
objects, there are several that have been set apart as being distinctly animate. Self-propulsion has 
long been thought to be one of the most prominent of these traits, as being able to move oneself 
can create an impression of agency (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Opfer, 2002). Agency is also linked 
to intentional actions, which in turn lead to attributing beliefs about animacy. Behaving 
intentionally has been shown to correlate with viewing an object as an organism and giving it 
biological capacities (Opfer, 2002). These two traits – self-propulsion and intentionality – combine 
to produce teleological action. Opfer & Siegler (2004) found that behaving teleologically is nearly 
as potent in determining animacy as directly telling a child that an object is alive. One final 
behavioral characteristic is contingency. Contingency has been shown to cause children to respond 
to an object in similar ways to how they respond to humans (Johnson et al., 1998).  
 Each of these characteristics has been shown to be associated with animacy; as such, 
animacy itself could be dependent upon acquiring the right combination of these traits. In this 
scenario, an animate object would be an object that displays enough of the right characterist ics, 
while an inanimate object is one that does not display such traits. Opfer & Siegler (2004) 
considered the role of characteristics by teaching children about the characteristics of an object 
and seeing how this impacted their judgments of animacy. They found that when children were 
taught that an object behaves teleologically, they changed their classification of the object to being 
animate (Opfer & Siegler, 2004). This suggests that adding a characteristic to an object can change 
the way the animacy of the object is perceived. This additive response is seen even among living 
things. For instance, children rated a rat as more animate than a starfish; while both subjects were 
living, the rat had one more animate characteristic (a face) than the starfish (Jipson & Gelman, 
2007). Lastly, this idea that adding characteristics and accuracy leads to increasing animacy is 
reflected in individual traits. Looser & Wheatley (2010) determined that adding more detail to a 
face and making it more accurate increased the animacy of the face until it hit a “tipping point”. 
After this tipping point, each face was “accurate enough” to be considered equally animate. If such 
an additive pattern can exist with individual traits in animacy, it is possible that the same pattern 
can be seen among multiple traits. Thus, adding animate characteristics to an inanimate object may 
push it over the “tipping point” of animacy.  
 Despite this evidence, it is also possible that animacy is not simply a sum total of an object’s 
traits. There are several ways this is supported. For instance, Jipson & Gelman (2007) found that 
both children and adults viewed man-made objects as inanimate, regardless of its other 
characteristics. Further, they found that a robodog that had more animate characteristics than a 
starfish was given fewer biological capacities and still viewed as less animate. In fact, their 
findings suggested that life (regardless of an inanimate’s characteristics) is the biggest factor in 
determining animacy from age 4 onward. Additionally, Gelman and Gottfried (1996) found that 
children and adults view autonomous movement differently in animals and artifacts. While self-
movement and agency were associated with causing animal movements, this was not the case for 
artifact movements. Because both entities had the same characteristic (autonomous movement) 
but were viewed differently, the characteristic alone was not determinant of animacy. Lastly, 
Johnson et al., (1998) found that coupling a face and contingency did not yield results that differed 
significantly from the results of either trait on its own. These findings suggest that the “tipping 
point” of animacy cannot be reached by simply giving an inanimate object multiple animate traits .  
 Robots propose a practical way to address this characteristic driven approach. Today’s 
robots have the capacity to embody many – if not all – of the traits commonly associated with 
animacy. If robots can be considered animate, then this would support the idea that animacy is 
based on the traits that are displayed. If robots are not considered to be animate, then animacy may 
not be based on the number of traits an object has. To determine if there is an additive effect of 
traits, it animacy will be broken down into the attributes given to the object. Specifically, these 
attributes will be biological (does it eat? sleep? require food?) and psychological (can it think? be 
happy or sad? make choices?). In previous studies, robots and certain inanimate objects have been 
commonly given psychological, but not biological, abilities (Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Beran et al., 
2011). Each of these past studies, however, considers only one or two characteristics and does not 
consider an additive effect of multiple characteristics on animacy. 
 The purpose of this study is to assess how characteristics impact children’s views of 
animacy by comparing the perception of a robot and a human. For each subject, multiple trials will 
add characteristics (robot) or take them away (human). The robot’s abilities will range from being 
highly inanimate (turned off) to seeming highly animate (fully functioning, interactive, mobile, 
and contingent). The human’s abilities will vary in the same manner – from fully interactive to 
acting as a statue and being completely nonresponsive. By varying each subject’s abilities, it will 
be possible to determine how animacy changes with abilities as well as the range of animacy that 
both the human and the robot can exhibit. This study expands upon previous research by using a 
highly humanistic robot that can display nearly all of the aforementioned characteristics. In 
addition, this study addresses the characteristic driven approach from multiple angles : 
characteristics are added to an inanimate object and also taken away from an animate object. This 
two sided approach ensures results that are not contingent on technology; the fault cannot entirely 
fall upon a robot that “is not good enough”. Thus this study proposes a way to take a 
comprehensive approach to the role of characteristics in making the animate/inanimate distinct ion.   
Method 
 Participants. Children ages 3, 5, and 7 will be recruited for this study. The 3 and 5 year 
olds will be recruited from a local preschool, while the 7 year olds will be from a local elementary 
school. Each age group will consist of approximately 30 children.  
Procedure 
 Familiarization Trials. The UBTech Alpha 2 Robot (one of the leading commercia l 
humanoid robots) will be used for all robot trials. All participants will be familiarized with the 
robot via four QuickTime™ videos. Two of these videos show the robot interacting with people 
in various ways, while the other two show it performing tasks on its own. In the interaction videos, 
the robot will interact contingently with people and will show a variety of different interactive 
abilities (e.g. telling stories, doing yoga). The independent videos will focus on autonomous 
abilities like the way it moves and independent tasks. These videos will be viewed in one session, 
with breaks between each video (approximately 3 minute videos with a 1 minute break). If a child 
becomes distracted, an experimenter will redirect their attention to the video.  
 Test Trials. Each participant will complete six test trials: three robot and three human. In 
these trials, both the human and the robot will display a range of animate characteristics. This 
range of characteristics will be broken down into animate, robotic, and still trials. For each of the 
human trials, a different experimenter will be used so that children do not carry information over 
from one trial to another. For all trials, a consistent experimenter (E1) will introduce the subject of 
the trial.  
Human Trials 
 Human-animate. E1 will introduce the subject of the trial by saying “I want you to meet 
one of my friends (name of experimenter - referred to as E2), can you say hi?”. After this brief 
introduction period, E1 will have to leave to go finish up a task in another room, and will ask the 
child to keep their friend company for a few minutes. E2 will then proceed to sit by the child and 
interact with them normally (asking how they are, things they are doing that day, things they like, 
etc.). E2’s responses will be animated and responses will be inflective/vary in volume when 
appropriate. After several minutes, E1 will return to the room, thank the child for keeping E2 
company, and have them say good-bye as E2 has to go home.  
 Human-robotic. E1 will introduce a different subject, this time saying “I want to show you 
something pretty cool - this is Bot. Bot can do a bunch of things, watch!” E1 will demonstrate how 
to ask Bot to do a non-interactive task, like sitting down, standing up, or telling the weather. Bot’s 
movements will be somewhat rigid, with minimal facial expressions and little to no inflection in 
vocal responses. After this demonstration, E1 again has to leave the room, and asks the child to try 
seeing what Bot can do. The child will lead all interactions from this point and Bot will only 
respond to specific requests of things to do. When E1 returns (minutes later) they will apologize 
for having to leave so suddenly and ask Bot to do their favorite trick before leaving – a somersault!  
 Human-still. E1 comes into the room alone, and tells the child they need to move a statue 
for a friend into the room for a few minutes so they can finish another task they are doing. After 
informing the child, E1 will leave and come back pushing E2 on a rolling desk chair. Once they 
are in the room E1 will say “I just need a minute to go finish up in the other room, you’re welcome 
to look at this though. It doesn’t move by itself, but you can move it just like a doll”. E1 leaves, 
and the child is free to look at E2. E2 is to remain completely still for the duration of this trial, and 
will arrange for this (e.g. tying back long hair that could cause irritation, wearing a sweatshirt to 
hide breathing, keeping eyes closed to avoid blinking). If the child decides to move them, they are 
not to resist but to move like a doll would – imagining stiff joints. E1 will return, tell the child 
they’re all finished, and then roll E2 back to the other room.  
Robot Trials 
 Robot-animate. E1 will introduce the UBTech robot saying “I want you to meet one of my 
friends, this is Tommy! Can you say hi?” Tommy will be programmed to respond to the child in 
this trial, and will respond to the child’s greeting. E1, realizing they didn’t finish up in the other 
room, will leave the child with the robot, asking them to “entertain Tommy for a bit, I know he 
loves yoga and telling stories. I bet if you ask he’ll do that with you!”. The child can then play 
with and talk to the robot, not necessarily asking to do one of these things with the robot. After a 
few minutes, E1 will return and ask the child what they did with Tommy while they were gone. If 
the child says they did something, E1 will comment that it sounds like they’ll be good friends and 
if they didn’t do anything E1 will seem sad that the child didn’t like their friend. E1 will then “take 
Tommy home”.   
 Robot-generic. E1 will bring the UBTech robot into the room saying “I want to show you 
something pretty cool, this is Bot. Bot can do a bunch of things, watch!” E1 will then demonstrate 
how to ask the robot to do a non-interactive task, like moving in a certain way or telling them the 
weather. E1 will invite the child to ask a similar question, and then realize they have to run out 
real quick saying “I know he doesn’t do much, but why don’t you try those things I just did?” E1 
will return in a few minutes to take Bot out of the room. After thanking the child for being patient 
while they had to work, they will have Bot perform their favorite task – a yoga pose! 
 Robot-still. E1 brings the UBTech robot into the room (turned off) saying “Is it okay if I 
leave this here? I’m trying to clean up in the other room and need a bit more space. You’re welcome 
to look at it.” The robot is left near the child for their observation. After a few minutes, E1 returns 
having finished cleaning and needing to put the robot back where it belongs.  
 Each trial will last no more than 10 minutes, and both a human and a robot trial will occur 
(in random pairs) every other day, for a total of 6 days. Immediately following the test trial, the 
child will be asked a series of questions by a different experimenter (not E1 or the E2 for the 
current trial), who will return to the room with the child and ask them “a few questions on what 
they thought of [the object or the name of the person/robot].” To check general understanding, the 
child will be asked if they remember [the object/person/robot] and what they did with them. The 
following questions will focus on biological and psychological capacities and come from Opfer 
(2002). The biological questions will be: “Can it grow?”, “Can it die?”, “Does it need food?”, 
“Does it need water?”, “Does it need something”, “Can it make more little ones like it”, and “Is it 
alive?”. Psychological questions consist of: “Can it want something?”, “Can it be happy?”, “Can 
it make choices?”, “Can it think”, “Can it see?”, “Can it feel pain?”, and “Can it make plans?”.  
 The scoring of these responses will be broken up by biological or psychologica l 
attributions. In each category, a “yes” response will receive a score of 2 and a “no” response will 
be a 0, with any “don’t know” responses receiving a score of 1. This scoring has been chosen as a 
“don’t know” response is likely to demonstrate confusion or indecision on an ability, which could 
indicate that it has properties of both the yes and no response. The highest (most animate) score 
for either category will be a 14 (for a total of 28), with the lowest score (least animate) being a 0. 
As a final way to address animacy in general, the 5 and 7 year olds will be asked to give an overall 
response to how “alive” the trial’s subject is. Responses will be scored similarly to the 0-2 scale 
above but will be shown with a thumbs up, thumbs down, or in between.  
Results/Inferences 
 Analyses of variance will consider a 2 (human vs robot) x 3 (still, robotic, animate) design. 
Both agency and condition will likely have a significant impact the animacy scores and aliveness 
ratings, and both will likely produce main effects. Additionally, it is also possible to see an 
interaction between the agent and condition for certain trials.   
 One of the first expected results is a main effect of the agent. This will be gauged by the 
total animacy score that combines biological and psychological capacities. It is likely that the 
human will receive higher animacy scores than the robot, regardless of condition. Such a result 
would support that animacy may not be based upon characteristics because one item can score 
higher than another, regardless of ability. In contrast, there will also likely be a main effect of 
condition, wherein the animate condition will score higher than the still condition (with the robotic 
falling somewhere between) regardless of the agent. This supports the characteristic approach 
given that an item with more abilities scores higher than an item with fewer abilities, independent 
of the item itself. Since these two results seem to contradict each other, it will be important to look 
at other measures of animacy. 
 In contrast to the survey, the “aliveness test” (thumb rating scale) provides the child’s basic 
response to the object – either it is alive, not alive, or somewhere in between. This test is a simple 
and direct way to categorize animacy, instead of basing it on behavioral and mental characterist ics. 
For these results, the main effect of the agent would be predicted, as a child’s instinctive response 
would be to view a human as animate and a robot as inanimate. However, there may not be a main 
effect of condition for the same reason; the instinctual response may be that the robot, regardless 
of ability, is an inanimate object. In this case, animacy as characteristics is not supported because 
children’s most direct response is that the robot is not human. If this main effect of condition did 
occur, then this would support the characteristic based approach to animacy. Should this be the 
case, it again leaves potentially conflicting results (where the main effect of agency seems to reject 
the characteristic approach but the main effect of condition supports it), making analyses of the 
interactions between agent and condition ever more important.  
 It will be important to consider the range of animacy scores between conditions as a factor 
of agency. While the values are different (as measured by the main effects) it may be that varying 
the condition has a different impact on the animacy scores for the different agents. For instance, 
the human may have a very small range of animacy when compared to the robot, because children 
instinctively know that a human is animate, even if they do not seem to have any abilities. In this 
case, the robot – which while viewed as less animate – has a greater potential to change its animacy 
than did the human. Despite this seemingly greater flexibility, this goes against the characterist ic 
approach for two reasons. First, if behavioral characteristics are the main factor in determining 
animacy, then these characteristics should have the same effect on animacy scores, regardless of 
agent. That is to say that adding contingency, for example, should increase the robot’s and the 
human’s score by the same amount regardless of what the score actually was. Second, this greater 
flexibility does not necessarily imply that the robot can achieve animacy. For instance, even if the 
robot’s scores vary from 0 – 14, their highest score is still only half of the full range of animacy. 
To confirm this idea, the aliveness scale should be compared across conditions. If the animate 
robot is still getting the “thumbs down” then it is still being viewed as inanimate – despite the 
greater flexibility the robot seems to have.   
 Next, animacy scores will be broken down into biological and psychological abilit ies. 
Biological questions will likely show an effect of agent, while the psychological questions may 
show an effect of condition. The human is likely to be given more biological attributes than the 
robot, regardless of condition. This would indicate that no matter how life-like a robot may seem, 
it will not take on biological capacities. Such evidence would go against the idea that an object’s 
animacy is determined by the characteristics it displays, as children would not give even a highly 
functional inanimate object biological tendencies. Psychological capacities, however, have been 
shown to be connected to different traits and thus are likely to respond to condition. Children are 
more apt to give psychological tendencies to objects with a face (Jipson & Gelman, 2007) or 
objects that display intelligence (Beran et al., 2011). As such, the animate condition for both the 
human and robot trials should show the highest scores in terms of their psychological capacitie s. 
If this occurs, it would support the characteristic approach since these animate capacities are given 
out as a function of behavioral characteristics.  
 Finally, scores will be compared across ages. Trends between ages could occur for total 
animacy, or by how the total scores are broken down. For instance, younger children are more 
likely to give biological traits to inanimate objects (Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Opfer, 2002). In 
keeping with this, older children strongly favor giving out psychological abilities (Opfer, 2002). 
Further, it would be interesting to note whether any biological or psychological traits stand out in 
terms of how often then are accepted or reject with the human or the robot. For instance, several 
of the psychological traits are linked to emotions. Beran et al. (2011) found that children are more 
likely to give inanimate objects psychological traits relating to memory and cognitive abilities than 
understandings of emotion. This same aversion could occur with biological traits as well. Such 
trends and distinctions would be useful in better understanding how children understand animate 
and inanimate objects. 
 In general, these results will not be representational of how people perceive robots in 
everyday life. The study is designed to give robots the best prospect for being life-like, while the 
humans are set up to be unrealistically inanimate. In both animate conditions, the subjects are 
presented excitedly and with human names. In the inanimate conditions, subjects are not given 
identities or capabilities. It is therefore possible that the children provide answers that agree with 
what the adult is saying, rather than what the child actually believes. This effect will be minimized 
by having a different experimenter ask the survey questions, so the child does not feel pressured 
to agree with E1’s beliefs. It is also possible for the robot trials to be influenced by order effects 
since each child in the same condition is seeing the same robot (unlike in the human condition, 
where it is a different adult each time). By familiarizing the child to the robot’s abilities before 
seeing the trials, the child should come to understand its abilities, just as they have a prior 
understanding of human’s abilities before the trials. Lastly, with the exception of the 7 year olds, 
these children are at the most animistic ages and are the most likely to give a robot life-like traits.  
 This study is meant to reveal the extremes of how “alive” robots and humans can be. The 
results will speak to the future of intelligent robots: if animacy comes from displaying the proper 
traits, then robots could potentially rise to the same level of animacy as humans. If this is not the 
case, then perhaps robots will never reach this level of advancement. Further, the results will lead 
to the question of whether or not we want robots to be able to do this. This is especially relevant 
when considered with the results of the human trials: if a low-functioning human can seem less 
alive than a robot, then robots could come to play a major role in our everyday interactions. This 
study will also shed light on the balance between biological and psychological capacities in 
determining animacy. Currently, biology is one of the main ways that children decide if an object 
is alive (Jipson & Gelman, 2007). As such, children are more liberal with their attribution of 
psychological properties (Beran et al., 2011). By looking at this spectrum of abilities and the 
breakdown of how children attribute these properties, the impact of an object’s characteristics can 
be observed. This will either support or refute the idea that living things are defined by a collection 
of characteristics that we learn about early in life and come to associate with being alive.  
  
References 
Bartneck, C., Kanda, T., Mubin, O., & Al Mahmud, A. (2009). Does the Design of a Robot 
Influence Its Animacy and Perceived Intelligence? International Journal of Social 
Robotics, 1(2), 195-204. doi:10.1007/s12369-009-0013-7  
 
Beran, T. N., Ramirez-Serrano, A., Kuzyk, R., Fior, M., & Nugent, S. (2011). Understanding 
how children understand robots: Perceived animism in child–robot interaction. 
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 69(7-8), 539-550. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2011.04.003  
 
Dolgin, K. G., & Behrend, D. A. (1984). Children's Knowledge about Animates and Inanimates. 
Child Development, 55(4), 1646. doi:10.2307/1130034  
 
Gelman, S. A., & Gottfried, G. M. (1996). Children's Causal Explanations of Animate and 
Inanimate Motion. Child Development, 67(5), 1970. doi:10.2307/1131604  
 
Jipson, J. L., & Gelman, S. A. (2007). Robots and Rodents: Children’s Inferences About Living 
and Nonliving Kinds. Child Development, 78(6), 1675-1688. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2007.01095.x  
 
Johnson, M. H., Dziurawiec, S., Ellis, H., & Morton, J. (1991). Newborns' preferential tracking 
of face-like stimuli and its subsequent decline. Cognition, 40(1-2), 1-19. 
doi:10.1016/0010-0277(91)90045-6  
 
Johnson, S., Slaughter, V., & Carey, S. (1998). Whose gaze will infants follow? The elicitation 
of gaze-following in 12-month-olds. Developmental Science, 1(2), 233-238. 
doi:10.1111/1467-7687.00036  
 
Looser, C. E., & Wheatley, T. (2010). The Tipping Point of Animacy: How, When, and Where 
We Perceive Life in a Face. Psychological Science,21(12), 1854-1862. 
doi:10.1177/0956797610388044 
 
Luo, Y., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Can a Self-Propelled Box Have a Goal?: Psychological 
Reasoning in 5-Month-Old Infants. Psychological Science, 16(8), 601-608. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01582.x  
 
Opfer, J. E. (2002). Identifying living and sentient kinds from dynamic information: The case of 
goal-directed versus aimless autonomous movement in conceptual change. Cognition, 
86(2), 97-122. doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(02)00171-3  
 
Opfer, J. E., & Siegler, R. S. (2004). Revisiting preschoolers’ living things concept: A 
microgenetic analysis of conceptual change in basic biology. Cognitive Psychology, 
49(4), 301-332. doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2004.01.002  
 
 
 
